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Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest: 
Can Courts and Legi~latures Impose 
Limits on a Bright Line Rule?* 
by Adam M. Gershowitz 
Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law 
Imagine that Defendant Dan is stopped by the police for driv-
ing through a stop sign. The officer thinks that Dan looks suspi-
cious, but has no probable cause to believe Dan has done any-
thing illegal, other than driving recklessly. Because running a stop 
sign is an arrestable offense and the officer is suspicious that Dan 
might be involved in more serious criminal activity, the officer 
arrests Dan for the traffic violation. 
Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, officers are entitled 
to search the body of the arrestee to ensure that he does not have 
weapons and to prevent him from destroying evidence. The search 
incident to arrest is automatic and allows officers to open contain-
ers found on the person, even when there is no probable cause to 
believe anything illegal is inside. For instance, a standard search 
incident to arrest often turns up drugs located in a small container 
such as a cigarette pack. Yet, Dan does not have a cigarette pack 
in hi s pllcke t: instead. like millions of ()th~r tcchnophilcs, f) ;1I1 is 
ca rry ing '~lr1 iPhonc. 
The officer removes the iPhone from Dan's pocket ,lIld be-
gins to nmunagc through Dan's cell phone contacts, call history, 
emails, pictures, movies, and, perhaps most significantly, his inter-
net browsing history. Thus, in addition to finding Dan's personal 
financial data and embarrassing personal information, the police 
also discover incriminating pictures of stolen contraband, em ails 
evidencing drug transactions, and internet surfmg of websites 
containing child pornography. Is all of this evidence admissible 
even though Dan has only been arrested for a traffic infraction and 
there was no probable cause (not to mention no warrant) to search 
the contents of his iPhone? When one considers the breadth of 
infonnation located in Dan's iPhone, it would seem shocking that 
* Adapted by permission of the UCLA Law Review from the 
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 56: 1, p. 27 (2008). . 
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officers need no suspicion whatsoever in order to search through 
that information. Yet, that result appears to follow from longstand-
ing U.S. Supreme Court precedent laid down well before hand-
held technology was even contemplated. 
... il we think 01 an iPhone as a 
container-like a cigarette package 
or a closed box-police can open 
and search the contents inside with 
no questions asked and no probable 
cause required, so long as they are 
dotng so pursuant to a valid arrest. 
For nearly four decades, the search incident (0 arrest doctrine 
has functioned as a bright-line rule ~allowing police to search the 
entire person of an arrestee without getting into sticky questions of 
whether there was probable cause to open a particular container. 
See U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S . 218, 235 (1973). While society and 
technology have changed drastically over the last few decades, 
the search incident to arrest rule has remained static. Thus, if we 
think of an iPhone as a container- like a cigarette package or a 
closed box- police can open and search the contents inside with 
no questions asked and no probable cause required, so long as 
they are doing so pursuant to a valid arrest. And as scholars have 
long recognized, states have expansive criminal codes that give 
This publication was crea ted to provide )'0 \1 with accurate and authori tati ve in formation concerning the subject mailer covered; however, thb publ ie,lIi on was 
not necessari ly prepared by persons licensed to practice law in a particular jurisd ict ion. The publisher is not engaged in re fl(k rillg legal or other profess ional ad-
vice and thi s pllolical ill ll i, not a suilS lit\lte for the' advic0 of an att"rn~y. I f 1' •. 111 requ ire' I C~i\ l or t1 t h~ r e,\~xrt advice, you sli tl ulJ stek tlw se rvices of i\ compete'1I1 
attorn,,>· elf other profess ional. 
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police authority to arrest for a huge number of infractions, Thus, 
police officers with nothing more than a hunch of illegal activity 
may arrest an individual for a simple traffic violation, Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), and proceed to search 
thousands of pages of private data located on the iPhone found in 
an arrestee's pocket. 
This issue of Search & Seizure Law Report provides an over-
view of the history and scope of the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement. It then explains the com-
plicated problems that develop when this doctrine is applied to 
iPhones and other advanced cell phones. It also offers a number 
of approaches that courts and legislatures could adopt to narrow 
the scope of warrantless searches of iPhones and similar handheld 
wireless devices. 
Search incident to arrest doctrine as a 
search for bright-line rules 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause." Yet, as any criminal procedure student 
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knows, the Supreme Court has long recognized a slew of excep-
tions allowing the police to search without fust lProcuring a war-
rant. There is One exception of particular significance, perhaps the 
most common rationale for police to search without a warrant-
the search incident to arrest doctrine. ,( 
The history of the search incident to arrest exception dates back 
to the creation of the exclusionary rule in 1914, when the Supreme 
Court obliquely suggested in dictum that the government has the 
right "to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, 
to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Weeks v. 
U.s., 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). Although the Court alluded to 
such searches in that case and a handful of other early decisions, 
the doctrine's modem conception was the 1969 decision in Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
In Chimel, police arrested a suspect in his home for burglary 
and proceeded to search the entire three-bedroom house, as well 
as the attic and garage, for proceeds of that burglary. While the 
Court found this warrantless search to be unconstitutionally broad, 
it nevertheless recognized that police can search suspects incident 
to arrest in narrower circumstances. The Court explained that a 
search incident to arrest must be limited to a search for weapons 
that an arrestee could use against the officer and to prevent an 
arrestee from concealing or destroying evidence. The Court con-
cluded that a search for weapons and evidence must be limited to 
the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control 
from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evi-
dence. The Court specifically rejected the contention that police 
could search areas beyond that from which an arrestee could grab 
a weapon or evidence. 
A few years after Chimel, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether police could open closed containers located 
on an arrestee's person. In U.s. v. Robinson,414 U.s. 218 (1973), 
police arrested a suspect for operating a motor vehicle with a re-
voked license. While conducting a search incident to arrest, the 
officer felt an object in Robinson's coat pocket but could not tell 
what it was. The officer reached into the pocket and pulled out a 
"crumpled up cigarette package." Still not sure what was in the 
package, the officq opened it and discovcr('d capsuks of heroin. 
tn !ejecting Rubinsnn's challenge tu the'. sl.'alch, tile Court made 
clear that olticers conJucting a search incident to alTest (an open 
and search through all items on an arrestee's person, even if they 
are in a closed container, and even if the officers have no sllspicion 
that the contents of the container are illegal. The Court explained 
that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not require case-by-
case adjudication and that there need not be analysis of each step 
of the search to detennine whether it was necessary to prevent the 
arrestee from acquiring weapons or destroying evidence. Rather, 
Robinson made clear that searches of the arrestee's person and the 
containers thereon can be conducted automatically incident to an 
arrest. The Court's decision thus created a bright-line rule. 
The Court's affinity for bright-line rules became even clearer 
eight years later in New York v. Beltoll, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In 
Belton, the officer stopped a car for speeding and. upon smelling 
marijuana, arrested the occupants. With the occupants away from 
the vehicle, the officer then searched the passenger compartment 
of the car and found a jacket in the backseat. The officer unzipped 
the pockets of the jacket and found cocaine. Praising its decision 
in Robinson, the Court reafftrmed that police officers must be af-
forded "a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably en-
forced." Lamenting that there was not yet such a straightforward 
rule for the search of the interior of a car at a traffic stop, the Court 
adopted another bright-line rule pennitting the search of the entire 
passenger compartment of an automobile when an occupant of the 
car is lawfully arrested. 
© 2009, Thomson Reuters 
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Just as in Robinson, the Court made clear that the bright-line 
rule would apply even if there were no chance that an arrestee 
could break free of his restraints to grab a weapon or destroy evi-
dence in the passenger compartment of the car. The Court further 
explained that the search of the passenger compartment included 
any containers found therein, whether open or closed, and irre-
spective of whether they could contain a weapon or evidence. The 
Belton decision marked a considerable expansion of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine. 
In the Court's last significant search incident to arrest decision, 
Thornton v. U.s., 541 U.S. 615 (2004), an automobile was again 
the focus of attention. Unlike the occupant in Belton, the Thornton 
case involved a driver who had already exited and walked away 
from his vehicle before being approached by police. After Thorn-
ton was arrested for drug possession, the officer then proceeded to 
his vehicle and searched the passenger compartment incident to 
arrest. The officer found a handgun under the seat, which led to a 
charge of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 
crime. The Court once again stressed the need for a "clear rule, 
readily understood by police officers and not depending on differ-
ing estimates of what items were or Were not within reach of an 
arrestee at any particular moment." In rejecting Thornton's sup-
pression argument, the Court extended the Belton rule to permit a 
full-scale search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle inci-
dent to the arrest of a "recent occupant" of a vehicle. 
The Court's decisions over the last forty years suggest that 
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement 
should be interpreted expansively. Indeed, in Belton, the Court 
specifically stated that "container" should be interpreted broadly 
to include "any object capable of holding another object. It thus 
includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other 
receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, 
as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like." Consistent 
with this guidance,lower courts have taken a broad approach and 
upheld searches of numerous small containers incident to arrest, 
such as wallets, U.S. v. RodrigIlez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 
1993), envelopes, U.S. v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 
1985), and. aspirin bottles, Dalliels v. State, 416 So.2d 760 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1982). Although some state courts have interpreted 
thelr own \.'llJlstitutit)J]s and criminal l'cdt's to be Jl1U[t' rcst!ictive 
thall Iht' U.S. Constitution, !llo:;t lower courts have nut hesitated 
to apply the search incident to arrest doctrine to new sihHltions 
unforeseen by the Supreme COllrt. 
Bright-line rules in an era of pagers 
and cell phones 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Robinson and Belton made 
clear that, incident to a lawful arrest, officers can open contain--
ers located on a person or in their immediate grabbing space 
without having any independent probable cause to search those 
containers. For many years, the only evidence found as a result 
of such searches was tangible physical evidence, such as drugs 
or illegal weapons. As technology has advanced however,lower 
courts have been forced to rule On the admissibility of nontangible 
digital evidence located in electronic devices, specifically pag-
ers, cell phones, and computers. These courts have been forced to 
confront whether the search incident to arrest doctrine-designed 
with a world of tangible evidence in mind-should apply to data 
digitally contained in electronic devices. Most courts have upheld 
such searches. 
The earliest of these electronic data cases (and consequently 
the most primitive of the technology at issue) was a 1993 deci-
sion from the Northern District of California dealing with a pager 
found on an arrestee. U.S. v. Chal!, 830 F, Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 
1993). The defendant, Chan, was arrested as part of a drug sting 
© 2009, Thomson Reuters 
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operation and police found a pager on Chan's person. The police 
then activated the pager's memory function an4 retrieved tele-
phone numbers stored inside it. Two numbers found in the pager 
linked Chan to the drug sting the policy were conducting. Chan 
contended that he had a reasonable expectatiQn of privacy in the 
pager and that activating it amounted to a search that required a 
warrant. 
The court sided with Chan in part by agreeing that a pager is 
analogous to a closed container and that individuals have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the contents of electronic con~ 
tainers. However, the court ultimately concluded that because the 
search of the pager came on the heels of a lawful arrest of Chan, a 
warrantless search was permitted under the search incident to ar-
rest doctrine. Citing Belton and Chimel, the court concluded that 
an containers can be searched incident to a lawful arrest, inclUding 
electronic containers. Moreover, the court considered and specifi~ 
cally rejected as irrelevant the fact that Chan could not retrieve a 
weapon from the pager nor plausibly destroy any evidence from' 
the pager. Accordingly, the evidence found when the officer turned 
on and searched the pager was admissible. 
Over the next few years, a handful of other courts were called 
upon to analyze the question raised in Chan and these courts like~ 
wise pennitted the search of the contents of a pager incident to 
arrest. See U.s. v. Hunter, 1998 WL 887289, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct. 
29,1998) (per curiam); U.s. v. Ortiz, 84 F,3d 977, 983--84 (7th 
Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Stroud, 1994 WL 711908, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 
21,1994); U.s. v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir. 
1993); U.s. v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); U.s. 
v. Lynch, 908 F, Supp. 284, 290 (D.V.1. 1995). 
The era of pagers has all but ended, making way for the age 
of cell phones. To date, approximately two dozen courts have ad-
dressed searches of cell phones incident to arrest. The Fifth Cir-
cuit's recent decision in U.S. v. Finley, 477 FJd 250 (5~ Cir. 2007) 
is representative. Police arrested Finley after a staged drug sale. 
The police then searched Finley incident to arrest and found a cell 
phone in his pocket. One of the investigating officers searched 
through the phone's records and found text messages that ap-
peared to relate to dmg trafficking. One incoming text message 
---------- .~-------
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said, "So u wanna get some frozen agua," a common teml for 
methamphetamine. Another text message said, "Call Mark I need 
a 50," a likely reference to asking for fifty dollars' worth ofnarcot-
ics. Finley was convicted of aiding and abetting drug possession 
with intent to distribute. 
On appeal, Finley contended that the search of his cell phone 
was unlawful. The Fifth Circuit rejected Finley's contention that 
the cell phone could be seized but not searched. Relying on the 
conventional search incident to arrest caselaw-namely Robinson 
and Belton-the court explained that "police officers are not con-
strained to search only for weapons or instruments of escape on 
the arrestee's person; they may also, without any additional jus-
tification, look for evidence of the arrestee's crime on his person 
in order to preserve it for use at trial." The court further explained 
that police can open containers found on the arrestee's person and 
saw no reason why the doctrine should not be extended to text 
messages contained in a cell phone. 
In short, the Fifth Circuit did not recognize any conceptual dif-
ference between searching a person's body or physical containers 
on that body for drugs and searching electronic equipment for dig-
ital infonnation. As of December 2008, nearly twenty other courts 
have reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit and admit-
ted evidence seized from cell phones incident to arrest. See People 
v. Shepard, 2008 WL4824083 (CaI.App. 6 Dist. Nov. 7,2008), at 
*2; Slale v. Harris, 2008 WL 4368209, at *3-4 (Ariz. App. Sept. 
23,2008); Slale v. Smilh, 2008 WL 2861693, at *6-8 (Ohio App. 
July 25,2008); People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 215, 219 (Cal. 
App.2 Dist. 2008); U.S. v. Salllillall, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102-
03 (D. Ariz. 2008); U.s. v. YOllllg, 278 Fed. Appx. 242, 245-46 
(4~ Cir. May 15,2008); U.s. v. Deans, 549 F. Supp.2d 1085, 1094 
(D. Minn. 2008); U.S. v. Valdez, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 8, 2008); U.s. v. Carrol, 537 F. Supp.2d 1290, 1301-02 
(N.D. Ga. 2008); U.s. v. Cllrry, 2008 WI. 219966, at *8-10 (D. 
Me. Jan. 23,2008); U.s. v. Lollie, 2007 WL 4722439, at *4 (N.D. 
Ind. Oct. 12,2007); U.s. v. Mercado-Nava,486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 
1275-76 (D. Kan. 2007); U.S. v. Murphy, 2006 WI. 3761384, at 
*4 (W.D. Va. Dec. 20,2006); u.s. v. Diaz, 2006 WI. 3193770, at 
''4-5 (N D, Cal, Nov. 2,20(6); u.s. 1', 7mllotll, 2006 \VL <-118390. 
at "5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21,20(6); U.s. v. Cole, 2005 IVL 1323343. at 
*6 (N.D. III. May 26,2006); U.S. v. Brookes, 20051V1. 1940124, 
at *3 (D.V.Uune 16,2005); U.S. v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 
1303 .. D4 (D. Kan. 2003). 
To be sure, two lower courts have suppressed evidence found 
on cell phones pursuant to a search incident to arrest. See U.s. v. 
Park,2oo7 WI. 1521573, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); 
U.s. v. Losalle, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7-8 (D. Haw. May 9, 
2007). Yet, those decisions rested primarily on grounds that the 
search took place too long after the arrest to be considered a con-
temporaneous search incident to arrest. 
Perhaps the reason for the lack of contrary authority is that 
searching a conventional cell phone or pager incident to arrest 
is relatively easy to square with precedent that pennits police to 
search tangible containers found on an arrestee. A cell phone's 
memory of incoming and outgoing caUs, as well as its text mes-
sages, can easily be analogized to an address book Or a letter in an 
envelope, Much as the traditional search incident to arrest cases 
permit police to open a wallet, take out a letter, and read it be-
fore the arrestee has an opportunity to destroy the evidence, it "also 
makes sense to allow the police to review electronic call histories 
and text messages in a cell phone, An arrestee familiar with the 
functions of his cell phone could just as easily delete text mes-
sages or call logs as he could tear up a letter or an incriminating 
list of addresses on a piece of paper. 
12 
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Stakes and likely results when iPhone 
meets search incident to arrest 
doctrine 
To date, no court has been cal1ed upon t6 address the consti-
tutionality of searching an iPhone. In light of the handful of cell 
phone and pager cases discussed by the lower federal and state 
courts, it might seem that there is no difference in searching an 
iPhone. Just as text messages stored on a cell phone are evidence 
within a digital container, it would seem that caB histories, emails, 
and pictures on an iPhone would simply be characterized as evi-
dence stored in a (larger) digital container. As a conceptual mat-
ter, there is no real difference between a crumpled up cigarette 
package, an early-generation ceB phone, and an iPhone with a 
much larger memory, Yet, this is cause for concern because no 
matter what theoretical similarities exist between an iPhone and 
a conventional cell phone (or a cigarette package for that matter), 
the former stores' tremendously more information and in a' very 
different way. The differences can be demonstrated by thinking 
about how many steps or searches police might be able to take 
with respect to the new and old technology. 
The cell phone and pager cases decided by courts in the last few 
years are what we might call first level cases because they do not 
require in-depth searching to obtain evidence. Police need to push 
only a limited number of buttons in order to reach pager numbers 
and only a few additional buttons to retrieve text messages, If we 
think of each step that police must take to retrieve infonnation as 
a separate search, then reviewing pager numbers might amount to 
only two levels of searches: first, pushing the memory button for 
the list of recent pages; and second, scrolling through the numbers 
to fmd the incriminating calls, Reviewing text messages on a cell 
phone can be conceptualized as three separate searches: (1) open": 
ing the text message function; (2) opening the list of received text 
messages; and (3) opening and reading a particular text message. 
This is similar to the searches in Robinson where the police officer 
(I) felt the cigarette package; (2) pulled out the package; and (3) 
opened the package. 
Put simply, the data on early-generation cell phones is limited 
ill it~ <lrnollnt and usefulness. and pl)\il'l' officers will t>ither find 
the evidence or rUIl into a dead end mther qllickly. Accordingly. 
the degree of privacy invasion can be me<lsured by the number or 
steps an officer must take to retrieve the incriminating infonna-
tion. In the cases decided to date dealing with text messages and 
pagers, this number has been small because those devices have 
few, relatively simple functions capable of storing electronic data. 
The same can be said for tangible evidence such as cigarette pack~ 
ages, purses, wallets, or suitcases. 
.. ,the iPhone stores tremendously 
more information ... 
The iPhone drastically changes this situation for two reasons. 
First, the iPhone stores tremendously more infonnation-thereby 
providing law enforcement with access to infonnation that the 
typical arrestee would otherwise be incapable of carrying in his 
pocket. In addition to the text messages, contact infonnation, and 
caU histories found on conventional phones, iPhones also contain 
an iPhoto application. This application holds far more pictures 
than could be stored on a conventional cell phone and displays 
them in much clearer detaiL Similarly, the iPhone's easily acces-
sible email application makes it simple to access thousands of 
new, saved, and sent email messages. The iPhone enables USers to 
© 2009, Thomson Reuters 
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store thousands of audio and video files. Music, books, and videos 
ranging from classical music to potentially obscene pornographic 
videos can be accessed with the touch of a few buttons. 
Second, and perhaps with greater ramifications than the data 
stored on the actual device, the iPhone provides a mechanism 
for accessing information via the internet. The iPhone's internet 
browser is just like the one found on a standard computer; it can 
dial out and retrieve information stored remotely with an internet 
service provider. An example is instructive. 
Imagine that an officer arrests an individual following a lawful 
traffic stop and finds an iPhone in the driver's pocket. The officer 
then takes the following steps: (1) activates the touch screen to 
view the phone's contents; (2) clicks on the internet browser icon; 
(3) clicks on the toolbar to find the bookmarks link; (4) finds a 
suspicious-looking bookmark labeled "porn pictures"; (5) clicks 
on that particular bookmark to bring up the webpage; (6) sees that 
the webpage contains a series of icons including a "members" but-
ton and clicks on that image; (7) brings up the "members" page 
which has a saved account number and password already entered; 
(8) clicks on the "submit" button which utilizes the saved account 
infonnation and password to bring up the content of the website; 
(9) sees that, in addition to pictures, the website also has a mes-
sage function and the account owner has two new messages; and 
(10) clicks on the message icon and brings up the two new mes-
sages, both of which detail an incriminating conversation about 
exchanging pictures of underage children. 
Or imagine how an officer could utilize the internet to cir-
cumvent an arrestee's privacy protections, such as if an arrestee 
had password-protected his iPhoto application to hide his photo-
graphs. After (I) turning on the iPhone; and (2) attempting to open 
the iPhoto application, the officer discovers that the application 
is password-protected and cannot be opened. The officer might 
then (3) activate the internet browser; (4) click on the browsing 
history to see what webpages the owner had visited; (5) click on 
the history link that referenced the arrestee's web-based email 
account-for instance, Yahoo! or GmaiI; (6) read through the 
folders in the email account until finding one labeled "personal 
infomlation"; (7) read through the messages in that folder until 
finding ,'In enwil with the subject "p~sswords"; (8) open that email 
and retlieve the password for the iPhoto application; (9) close the 
intemd browser and again click on the iPhoto application; (10) 
enter the password found in the email, thus opening the iPhoto 
application; (11) search through the folders in the iPhoto applica-
tion, finding the most suspiciously labeled folder-for instance, 
"kid pics"; and (12) open that folder and search through all of the 
pictures inside that folder. 
Countless other complicated scenarios could likewise be en-
visioned. As the scenarios become more convoluted, it becomes 
harder to analogize them to a closed container or a wallet con-
taining an address list. And indeed, the iPhone provides access to 
information that would almost never before be found in arrestees' 
pockets or immediate grabbing space, but which could potentially 
subject them to criminal prosecution. For instance: (I) bank state-
ments accessed via the saved password on your banking website 
or (2) MySpace or Facebook webpages that have personal data, 
pictures, contacts, and exchanges of messages. 
In searching for incriminating infonnation, officers will no 
doubt come into contact with extremely sensitive personal in-
fonnation that is not remotely illegal but which is nevertheless 
highly embarrassing. For instance, by searching an arrestee's in-
ternet browsing history, police might stumble across chat rooms 
demonstrating that the arrestee has unusual sexual proclivities. Or 
police might discover that the arrestee is homosexual and is trying 
to keep that information secret from her family or employer. If 
the arrestee is a politician, the ramifications would be particularly 
© 2009, Thomson Reuters 
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devastating if police were to discover from his emails that he has 
been having an affair or that he made derogatory) comments about 
other political figures. Additionally, an arrestee's internet brows-
ing history or his bookmarked webpages might lead to a health 
insurance website that includes bills for a s~rious or embarrass-
ing medical condition. lbe list of scenarios is endless. And while 
such embarrassing, but not incriminating, information probably 
would not be admissible in a prosecution, its discovery would 
cause emotional distress. Moreover, while noncriminal informa-
tion should never be released beyond the initial traffic stop if it has 
no place in a prosecution, it sometimes manages to find its way 
into the public domain. 
In sum, the search incident to arrest doctrine pennits police to 
search the contents of any container found on the arrestee, includ-
ing electronic receptacles of digital information. Courts already 
have held that the doctrine applies to the electronic contents of 
pagers and cell phones and pennits the copying of phone numbers 
and the reading of text messages. If courts take the next step-
and they almost certainly will-by applying the search incident 
to arrest doctrine to the iPhone, officers will be in a position to 
review incoming and outgoing call histories, scan contact lists, 
read thousands of emails, view nearly limitless numbers of color 
photographs and movies, listen to voicemail at the touch of the 
button, and view the internet websites that an arrestee has visited. 
Disentangling iPhone from bright-line 
rule: possible approaches to cabining 
search incident to arrest doctrine 
The difference between the data found on a cell phone and an 
iPhone is dramatic but, at present, the Fourth Amendment and its 
search incident to arrest doctrine make no distinction. Below, I of-
fer approaches that courts and legislatures might adopt to address 
the problem. 
Change nothing: search incident to 
arrest rule works well, so changing it 
to account for new technology is not 
good idea 
While it is undoubtedly troubling to permit sllspicioniess 
searches of the many applications of an iPhone, one could plausi-
bly argue that attempting to craft a rule disallowing such searches 
would be worse. At present, the search incident to arrest doctrine 
is a bright-line rule that is easy for police officers to understand 
and apply. And courts faced with a search incident to arrest usually 
have an easy time determining whether the officers' actions were 
permissible. Compare this to the rest of Fourth Amendment law, 
which is riddled with exceptions, caveats, and uncertainty. Indeed, 
the typical Fourth Amendment section of a criminal procedure 
textbook is at least twice as long as the Fifth Amendment section. 
Carving out an exception to the search incident to arrest doctrine 
to deal with the iPhone might afford more privacy protection to a 
device that is capable of holding reams of personal infonnation 
that individuals reasonably expect to be protected against govern-
ment intrusion, but at what cost? There is a colorable argument 
that any benefit to be had from a new rule would be outweighed 
by muddling one of the few areas of Fourth Amendment law that 
is currently intelligible. 
Nevertheless, while I do not desire that Fourth Amendment law 
be made any more complicated, ultimately, I am not convinced 
that courts should restrain themselves by applying an ill-fitting 
bright-line rule to the iPhone. I see two primary reasons. 
First, the major infonnal constraints typically facing police in 
executing searches are not present with respect to the iPhone. Po-
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lice investigations are ordinarily c~nstrained by limited resources 
and limited time. For example, while the Supreme Co~rt has held 
h t there is no Fourth Amendment search when pohee observe ~:Ckyards from helicopters or plane~, Fl?rida v: Riley, 488 U.S. 
445 (1989) (plurality opInIOn); Cali/orilla v. Oraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986), that has not enabled police to do so with imp~nity. 
pre departments typically cannot afford to buy or rent hehcop-
o lenor do they have the time to file flight plans, spend hours in 
thers, 'r and simply look around without being guided by some teat, .. 
particularized SUSpICion. 
The iPhone drastically changes the 
amount of private information that 
can be accessed during a search 
incident to arrest. 
With respect to the iPhon~, however, !h: new ~ec~n.ology in-
verts the typical state of affaus because It IS the mdlvldual. ~ot 
h police officer. who has the new technology. Moreover, unlike 
Ilt e ers the technology is everywhere. Apple is expected to sell yOv , . than ten million IPhones by the end of 2008. In the next 
more . '11 'Ph b' II 
d de millions of clnvers WI have an 1 one or a su stantm y eca, . kd' fh lhirt 
. 'lar device in theu poc ets unng many 0 t e near y t y sl~III'on traffic stops that occur each year, And unlike helicop-
ml 1 h Ii' h" I r airnlane flyovers, t e cost to po ce In searc 109 IS a most 
ters 0 ~r f J . S .. & d h I' 
'I A study by the Bureau 0 ustlce tattshcs loun t at po Ice 
ru. hed the car or the driver in 6,6 percent of the twenty-seven 
seare d"1 U d 
'11' n traffic stops that occurre 10 a parhcu ar year, pwar s 
ITII !O d d"d ffi f 470 000 searches were can ucte InCI ent to arrest at a tra IC 
o S~e BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF ~~~TICE CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY 
POLlCE, '1999, at 1,4 (2002). If police are ~lready conducting 
h searches incident to arrest, they can eaSIly take a few ex-suc ·Ph·· d . aments to seize the lone, tum It on, an start n1mmagmg lra m . . 
through its files and applications. 
lh~ iPhllJl<.: dl-a:o;(ically Ch;11.1g.e~ the ;Ullot.l1lt .Dr private inform<1-
. {I . { "Ill Ill' 'lCct..':-;scd dunn!o': a search lI1cldent to arrest. BE-llOIl h1 L, '. '-. ...._ 
cause the stakes <.W! higher a.nd ~()tentIally could aftect 1.1lI1~IOnS ot 
individuals, it is worth consldenng wheth~r the search Hlcldent to 
arrest doctrine might be amended to fix thiS problem. 
Change everything: limiting search 
incident to arrest doctrine in all police 
interactions to search related to crime 
of arrest 
The most drastic change to the search incident to arrest doc-
t . e-short of abolishing it altogether-would be to limit officers ::~earching for evidence of the crime for which the suspect was 
arrested. Thus if the driver were arrested for drug possession, po-
lice could sear~h anywhere drugs might be found. But if the driver 
were arrested for failure to wear a seatbelt, a search for drugs 
would be impennissible. Justice Antonin Scalia advocated this 
'revision to the search incident to arrest doctrine in his 2004 con-
curring opinion in Thornton v. U.s., in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the search of the pa.ssenger compart~ent of a "r~cent1y" 
occupied car. Joined by Justlce Ruth Bader GInsburg, JustICe Sca-
lia argued that searching a vehicle incide~t to ar,rest should only 
be pennitted when "it is reasonabl~ to behev.e eV,I,denc~ relate~ \0 
the crime of arrest might be found In the vehIcle. JustIce ScalIa s 
view departs from the traditional rationale for the search incident 
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to arrest doctrine. Instead of conducting the searches to prevent 
the arrestee from harming the officer or destroying evidence, such 
searches would be justified as "evidence-gathering\' exercises that 
can be conducted because of "a reasona.ble belief that evidence 
[will] be found." , i 
Justice Scalia wrote for only himself and Justice Ginsburg in 
expressing this view, so we might be inclined to dismiss this ap-
proach as simply unlikely to be adopted. However, it is not alto-
gether implausible to assume that Justice Scalia's position may 
some day command a majority: Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Alito have not yet had a chance to address this approach, and 
Justice Stevens and Justice Souter are on record as being very 
dissatisfied with the current state of the search incident to arrest 
doctrine. 
Besides its unlikely adoption, perhaps a stronger objection to 
Justice Scalia's approach is that the evidence-gathering approach 
lacks doctrinal justification. Searching to gather evidence during 
a search incident to arrest is troubling because it would pennit 
searches based on suspicion-rather than officer safety-that in-
volve less than probable cause, Likewise, such an approach would 
offer no justification for pennitting searches of the passenger 
compartment incident to arrest but not the tnlnk of the vehicle. 
On the plus side, Justice Scalia's approach would solve the iP-
hone dilemma by reconceptualizing the entire search incident to 
arrest doctrine, without requiring a special rule for particular new 
technology. If police could only search for evidence related to the 
crime of arrest, most traffic stops would not pennit searches of an 
iPhone's contents. And even when police were pennitted to search 
an iPhone incident to arrest, the scope of the search would be lim-
ited, If an officer arrested a driver for possession of drugs with in-
tent to distribute, it would make sense to search his text messages 
for further evidence of the crime, since that function is commonly 
used in conjunction with drug sales. But it would not seem to be 
permissible for the officer to search through the arrestee's pictures 
under the iPhoto function or the history section under his internet 
browser because such applications likely have nothing to do with 
drug sales. A rule limiting the search incident to arrest exception 
to the crime of aITest would prevent police from roaming at large 
among th(' thousands of pages of data held in the iPhnnc. 
Change by different sovereign: 
encouraging state legislatures 
to adopt more protective rule 
Scholars dispute the ability of state courts to provide greater 
protection of constitutional rights than federal courts. Although 
the debate rages, it is undisputed that, in the criminal procedure 
context, a number of states have imposed greater restrictions on 
searches and seizures under their state constitutions. Notably, nu-
merous state courts have cabined the search incident to arrest ex-
ception under state law to narrower circumstances than authorized 
by the Supreme Court. 
One approach states courts might take is the one advocated 
by Justice Scalia. If the Supreme Court refuses to limit the search 
incident to arrest doctrine to searches of the arrestee for weapons 
and evidence of the crime for which he has been arrested, then 
the state courts could look to their own constitutions to do so. To 
date, a handful of state courts have adopted this approach. State v. 
Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. (983) (en banc); State v. Caraher, 
653 P.2d 942 (Or. 1982) (en banc). 
Moreover, we should look beyond state courts to consider the 
role of state legislatures in crafting statutory protections. \Vhile 
new criminal procedure rules typically come from courts, it would 
be a mistake to ignore possible legislative solutions. And, indeed, 
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legislatures have taken action in the past to narrow what they be-
lieve to be an overly broad search incident to arrest doctrine. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's expansive 1973 decision 
in U.S. v. Robinson pennitting police to open al1 containers on a 
person incident to a lawful arrest, the Massachusetts legislature 
adopted statutory language specifically designed to narrow the 
search incident to arrest doctrine. For over thirty years, that statute 
has provided that 
[a] search conducted incident to an arrest may be made 
only for the purposes of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, 
contraband and other evidence of the crime for which the 
arrest has been made, in order to prevent its destruction or 
concealment; and removing any weapons that the arrestee 
might use to resist arrest or effect his escape. Property 
seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions 
of this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in 
criminal proceedings. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § I (West 2004). 
Other state legislatures could revise their codes to follow the 
Massachusetts model. Or those legislatures could take a differ-
ent approach and authorize the seizure of iPhones or other wire-
less devices incident to arrest but prohibit warrantless searches of 
those devices without a warrant. 
The key question is, how likely are legislatures to take action 
to protect iPhones from warrantless searches? Legislatures are 
not typically in the business of limiting police officers' ability to 
conduct criminal investigations. To the contrary, legislators' inter-
ests are typically in line with those of law enforcement and they 
therefore enact statutes that favor expansive police authority. Yet, 
when it comes to iPhones the situation might be different. Unlike 
the faceless backdrop in which legislators typically award police 
great investigatory powers, the scenarios in which an iPhone can 
be searched incident to arrest are likely to resonate with legisla-
tors. 
As typically middle- or upper-class individuals with teenage 
or young adult children, legislators are one of the demographic 
~rollps likely to purdHlse iPhnllcs. And while legislator:) rarely 
commit the crimes of murder or rape, as mostly middle-dass 
white men they are statistically more likely to be involved in com-
puter climes such as financial misconduct or fraud. It is evidence 
of these crimes that is most likely to accidentally Ulrn lip during 
a search of an iPhone incident to an arrest, whether for nmning a 
stop sign or driving while intoxicated. Moreover, while legisla-
tures are unlikely to have illegal child pornography on their com-
puters or iPhones, it is reasonable to assume many legislators have 
downloaded "run-of-the-mill" pornography. While this material is 
not illegal, its discovery would be embarrassing and politically 
devastating. 
Significant legislative protections for criminal defendants of-
ten arises in response to a particular legislator being put through 
the criminal justice process. Thus, while legislators are tough on 
crime and reluctant to reduce punishments or remove old crimes 
from the books, it is reasonable to expect that legislators will cre-
ate criminal procedure protections that track their own self-inter-
est. It is therefore possible that legislators will enact laws limiting 
the search of iPhones incident to arrest. 
Moreover,legislators have incentive to enact such restrictions 
to please constituents. \Vhile it is unlikely that a lobby will form 
to press for a law exempting iPhones from the search incident to 
arrest doctrine, it is entirely possible that in the near future a prom-
inent business executive or other powerful and connected indi-
vidual will be embarrassed when his iPhone is searched at a traffic 
stop. And when those middle- and upper-class individuals-the 
type who vote and, more importantly, have money to make cam-
© 2009, Thomson Reuters 
February 2009 V~lume 36, Number 2 
paign contributions-press for some legislative1action, lawmak-
ers will have little reason to refuse them. The soft-an-crime label 
tends not to stick when the new law bent;!fits a considerable major-
ity and protects the middle-class right to priv~cy. 
Change at the margins: 
open application test 
A more modest revision to the search incident to arrest doc-
trine, but one that nevertheless would eliminate the current bright-
line rule, would be for courts to adopt an open application test. 
Under an open application approach, police would be permitted 
to search any open application on the iPhone incident to arrest 
but would not be authorized to look through applications that are 
closed when the arrest is made. Thus, an individual who took steps 
to dose the iPhoto application could expect the pictures contained 
therein to remain ,private. More significantly, an individual who 
kept her iPhone off entirely could avoid any search of its con-
tents. 
There are at least two problems with this approach: First, it 
would be very difficult to know if officers are telling the truth 
when they 'say an application was open. Because an iPhone can 
be turned on si".1ply by tapping the touch screen and applications 
can be activated simply by touching an icon, it would be easy for 
officers to testify that an application was open at the time of ar-
rest, even if it was in fact closed. Of course, the prospect of police 
lying runs throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Police 
could just as easily lie and say they received consent to search the 
trunk of a vehicle when they in fact did not, or that they smelled 
marijuana when in fact there was no such smell. 
A second and more compelling reason to reject the open appli-
cation test is that it runs afoul of one of the original justifications 
for the search incident to arrest doctrine: preventing the destruc-
tion of evidence. Just as police could quickly open a closed ap-
plication on the iPhone, so too could a suspect. An arrestee skilled 
at using his iPhone might be able to turn on the device, select an 
application, and destroy text messag-es, emails, photos, or other 
evidence in a matter of seconds. 
Givell that the Supreme Court has adopted a ticiiotl that almust 
any physical evidence-whether in a c1os~d or open (olltainer-
in the,arrestee's grasp could potentially be destroyed (even if the 
arrestee is handcuffed) it would make little sense to draw a line 
forbidding searches of closed applications on an electronic device 
that an arrestee could easily open and destroy. 
Changing bright-line rule: limiting 
search incident to arrest doctrine to 
five steps of searches 
Another solution would be to limit police to only a fixed nUm-
ber of steps when searching the contents of an-iPhone incident to 
arrest. For instance, courts could set a bright-line rule that police 
can take five steps, but no more, when rummaging through an 
iPhone's contents. As with the open application test, this solution 
likely causes more problems than it would solve, but is worth ex-
ploring briefly. 
The primary virtue of the search incident to arrest doctrine is 
that it provides bright-line rules that are easily understood and ap-
plied. Thus, police know that they can open an arrestee's wallet 
but cannot search the trunk of his car. The primary detriment of 
the search incident to arrest doctrine is that it pennits the police to 
rummage through numerous layers of enclosed materials, even if 
there is no probable cause to believe contraband is buried beneath. 
This problem is particularly vexing with respect to the iPhone 
because it contains layer upon layer of data. As previously dis-
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cussed, police conceivably could (1) tum on the phone; (2) open 
an internet browser; (3) type in a web-based email account such 
as www.hotmail.com; (4) log into the account (if the user id and 
password are saved); (5) open a folder of messages; (6) open a 
particular message; (7) read the message; (8) open the attachment 
to the message; and so forth. 
One compromise approach would be to create a bright-line 
"five-level deep" rule (or some other admittedly arbitrary number) 
limiting the search of iPhones to a total of five steps. Under such a 
rule, the police could search five levels deep into an iPhone's con-
tents, but no further. Thus, for example, police could (1) tum on 
the phone; (2) open the internet browser; (3) type in a web-based 
email account such as www.hotmail.com; (4) log into the account 
(if the user id and password are saved); and (5) open a folder of 
messages. If the officer completes the fifth step without finding 
anything incriminating that could be destroyed, the officer would 
need to stop searching. To search further, the officer would need 
to prOCure a warrant. 
The main virtue to this approach is that it puts an outer limit 
on how far police may search electronic data while at the same 
time leaving intact a relatively bright-line rule that makes clear 
to police exactly how far they can go. On the other hand, whether 
police exceeded the five steps would certainly be debated in indi-
vidual cases. Judges would have to make findings of fact ranging 
from the simple-whether the phone was already turned on when 
the search incident to arrest began, thus not counting as one of 
the five steps-to more fuzzy inquiries. For instance, when po-
lice linked from one webpage to another, were they taking two 
steps, or just one? This sort of unguided fact-finding is exactly 
what courts have tried to avoid by advocating a bright-line search 
incident to arrest rule. 
Perhaps more obviously troubling, selecting a certain number 
of searches- for instance, saying that police can search five levels 
deep into an iPhone, but not six - is terribly arbitrary. \Vhile courts 
could say t~e number of levels is correlated to the likelihood that 
the arrestee could reach that data and destroy it, selecting a level 
would still be beyond the institutional capacity of courts. More-
over, no comparnblc five-step rille exists for searches of tangible 
evidence found during a typical search incident to alTest. If police 
can exceed five steps to discover drugs in a small bag hidden in-
side a box lying under some papers in the glove compartment of a 
car, it is difficult to juslify a five-step rule only for iPhoncs. 
Distinguishing between data on device 
and remotely-stored data accessible 
from device 
Finally, courts could try to draw a conceptual line between data 
that is "on" or "in" the iPhone and data that is simply accessible 
via the iPhone. This would essentially be drawing a line between 
the iPhone's internet browser function and its other applications. 
An arrestee's pictures in his iPhoto application, his text messages, 
and his incoming call history would be considered contained "in" 
the phone. If internet service were cut off, the owner of the phone 
would still be able to access these features because the data has 
been downloaded to the phone. By contrast, web-based email ac~ 
counts or other material that an individual accesses over the in-
ternet are not typically downloaded to the phone and are insteaq, 
for lack of a better phrase, simply floating around on electronic 
servers in cyberspace. Because such data is not physically pres-
ent on the iPhone without proactively seeking it out, courts and 
legislatures could draw a line forbidding such searches incident to 
arrest while allowing police to search applications that have data 
pennanently on the iPhone. 
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One wrinkle to this approach might be if the internet browser 
that allows the user to access infonnation floating in cyberspace 
is open when the officer searches the iPhone. For instance, what if 
the officer conducting the search incideht to ~rrest discovers that 
the internet browser is open to a web-based email account and the 
selected email has incriminating information in it? Surely it would 
not make sense to say that the officer could se~h the rest of the 
iPhone's applications but not the open web~based email. One solu-
tion to this problem would be to harken back to the original search 
incident to arrest jurisprudence that allows a full-scale search of 
some areas beyond the person of the arrestee if the area is in the 
immediate grabbing space. For instance, the search incident to ar-
rest doctrine typically does not allow a search of the trunk of a 
vehicle, but if the trunk is open and the arrestee is standing near 
it, then such a search is pennissible. In the hypothetical scenario 
outlined above, web-based email can be analogized to the trunk 
of a car. The web-based email, banking infonnation, or MySpace 
page, would typically be considered to be outside the grabbing 
space of the suspect. However, when the webpage is open in the 
internet browser at the time of arrest it would be within the ar~ 
restee's immediate grabbing space. 
Thinking in tenns of physical tangible space, an approach that 
differentiates between material downloaded onto the iPhone and 
material that is simply accessible via the iPhone seems to make 
sense. Just as officers could search the cigarette pack in Mr. Rob-
inson's pocket, they can also search the photos he is carrying on 
his iPhone. And just as the police could not search Mr. Robinson's 
medical records stored in his house (rather than on his person), the 
police also could not search electronic data not currently down~ 
loaded onto his phone. 
Yet, the comparison with Robinson's medical records fails at 
a certain level when we consider that one purpose of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine is to prevent destruction of evidence. 
Of course, Mr. Robinson could not destroy the medical records 
in his house while being arrested at a traffic stop. Yet, he could 
quickly open his internet browser, log onto his web-based email 
account. and dt>stroy incriminating t'vidence without ('wr It'a\'in.~ 
the traftle stop. Nevertheless, this appronch is conceptually prom-
ising because it does not require a wholesale revision of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine, which has been framed with tangible 
physical evidence in mind. 
Conclusion 
At the end of the day, all of the approaches outlined above ap-
pear to be somewhat unsatisfying. Pennitting the police to search 
only for evidence related to the purpose of arrest would improve 
the doctrine for all cases, not just those involving iPhones, but it 
has recently been rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court. 
Asking state legislatures to limit police to search incident to ar-
rest only for evidence related to the arrest is plausible, but highly 
unlikely to occur in many states. An open application test may 
encourage police deception and will likely create the types of fac~ 
tual disputes that the bright-line search incident to arrest doctrine 
was designed to avoid. A five-step limit wil11ikewise raise factual 
questions that are best avoided. Finally, while a rule that differ-
entiates between data on the iPhone and data accessible via the 
phone is the most conceptually pure, it does not account for the 
possibility that arrestees could still destroy data that is merely ac-
cessible via the iPhone. Nevertheless, despite the flaws associated 
with each proposal, all are likely preferable to doing nothing and 
allowing police to search thousands of pages of electronic data 
without probable cause or a warrant. 
© 2009, Thomson Reuters 
